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The law must be stable, but it must not stand still.
- Roscoe Pound (1870 - 1964)
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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
1. The Issue.
This memorandum addresses the legal status of mercenaries captured during internal
conflicts, under international humanitarian law. The first part of this memorandum briefly
discusses the protected status captured mercenaries have enjoyed throughout history. The
second part of this memorandum analyzes the current prisoner of war regime in international
humanitarian law governing international conflicts, namely The Geneva Conventions and
Protocol I, and the Protocol’s possible status as customary international law. The third part
performs the same analysis on current international humanitarian law governing internal armed
conflicts. The fourth part discusses recent conventional law, in attempts to curb the use of
mercenaries, produced by the United Nations and the Organization for African Unity. The fifth
part discusses the definition of an armed conflict and defines the Rwandan conflict as an internal
conflict, or a mixed conflict. The sixth part explains how the creation of new customary
international law for internal conflicts by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia creates standards for the treatment of captured mercenaries in Rwanda. The seventh
part considers the concept of belligerency, its vitality, the problems associated with its
reemergence, and its usefulness in the future. The eighth and final part of this memorandum
offers the conclusion that mercenaries captured during the conflict in Rwanda are entitled to
minimal protections currently recognized under customary international law.
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2. Summary of Conclusions.
a) The Geneva Conventions Recognize Captured Mercenaries as
Prisoners of War, while Protocol I Explicitly Denies Mercenaries
Prisoner of War Status.
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions contains a specific provision, Article 47,
that explicitly denies mercenaries, captured during an international conflict, the status of prisoner
of war. However, the pre-Protocol I laws governing international conflict codified in the Geneva
Conventions make absolutely no mention of mercenaries. There is considerable scholarly
commentary suggesting that mercenaries were not meant to be distinguished from regular
combatants when applying the pre-Protocol I prisoner of war regime. Hence, before Protocol I
ratification, mercenaries could qualify for prisoner of war status. The difference between the
Geneva Conventions and Protocol I on the issue of mercenaries is stark and troublesome. Many
critics of Article 47 believe the article itself is in disharmony with the basic principles of
international humanitarian law. Furthermore, many feel that Article 47 employs an inadequate
definition and offers mercenaries a disincentive from complying with the laws of war. In
addition, while some legal scholars think many of the Protocol’s provisions have ripened into
customary international law, it is problematic to give Article 47 the same status. Finally, while
the legal paradigm of an international conflict is not directly applicable to the Rwandan conflict,
however, the difference between the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I is an obvious
manifestation of the international community’s growing contempt for mercenaries during the
latter part of the twentieth century.
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b) Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol II have no
Prisoner of War Regime, thus Granting Captured Mercenaries a
Minimal Level of Protection.
Mercenaries captured in non-international conflicts are entitled to protections
under international humanitarian law. Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions is one of the few
parts of the conventions that provides standards for non-international conflicts. All parties to
such a conflict are under obligation to observe Article 3 once hostilities begin. Article 3’s
purpose is to guarantee basic principles of humane treatment for all persons no longer involved
in the conflict. Persons protected under the article’s scope include the sick, wounded, and
combatants no longer taking part in the hostilities. Captured mercenaries fit the latter criteria.
Furthermore, Protocol II does not espouse a prisoner of war regime for non-international
conflicts, emphasizing the notion that mercenaries are not to be distinguished from regular
combatants or denied the basic protections enumerated in Article 3. Protocol II’s purpose was to
expand basic protections. For instance, detained persons cannot be subject to collective
punishments, corporal punishments, or slavery. According to many legal writers, mercenaries
who are captured during non-international conflicts are protected under the provisions of Article
3 and Protocol II.
c) The Conflict in Rwanda can be Defined Either as an Internal
Conflict, or a “Mixed Conflict.”
Defining a conflict as an international or internal armed conflict, determines which
standards and provisions of international humanitarian law govern the conflict in question. The
international armed conflict classification brings with it the full weight and force of international
humanitarian law. In contrast, internal armed conflicts, or conflicts not of an international
character, are primarily controlled by Article 3, common to all four Geneva Conventions, and
Protocol II. According to Article 4 of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (I.C.T.R.)
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Statute, the U.N. Security Council sought to classify the hostilities in Rwanda as an internal
conflict, thereby triggering Article 3 and Protocol II. However, many legal scholars choose to
characterize the events in Rwanda as a mixed conflict. Such a conflict has been described as an
internal conflict that has been internationalized by foreign influences. Nonetheless, in the
context of current international humanitarian law, the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda Statute acts as a definitive indication that the international community sees the Rwandan
conflict as an internal conflict, and not as an international conflict.
d) The I.C.T.Y.’s decision in The Prosecutor v. Tadic Creates
Customary International Law Applicable to Mercenaries Captured
During the Rwandan Conflict.
In The Prosecutor v. Tadic, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(I.C.T.Y.) encountered the issue of applying international humanitarian law to a modern-day
mixed conflict. The Tribunal concluded that some of the provisions in the Geneva Conventions
and the Additional Protocols had crystallized into customary international law. Specifically, the
I.C.T.Y. found that those provisions protecting persons no longer involved in an internal conflict
were to be afforded Article 3 and Protocol II protections as a matter of custom. On appeal, the
I.C.T.Y. Appeals Chamber affirmed this evolution of customary law and articulated clearer
standards. The Appeals Chamber indicated that all persons who had laid down their arms were
now entitled to the new customary protections. Hence, it seems that the only way a captured
mercenary can be subject to Article 47 of Protocol I is to be involved in what is clearly an
international armed conflict. As long as a conflict escapes such a classification, the I.C.T.Y.’s
customary law is controlling. Therefore, based on the I.C.T.Y.’s conclusions, it is probable that a
captured mercenary has a legal right to Article 3 and Protocol II protections under customary
international law in any non-international armed conflict.
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II. MERCENARISM: A BRIEF HISTORICAL REVIEW
Before setting forth an overview of current international humanitarian law, revealing the
contempt and disregard modern international lawmakers have towards mercenaries, a quick
study of the history of mercenarism brings to light a very different approach. Mercenaries have
existed since the earliest recorded armed conflict.1 Unlike today, mercenaries in ancient wars
were not distinguished from other combatants. In fact, mercenaries were once respected
professionals.2 The Roman Empire often used mercenaries, especially after the first century
A.D., to ward off Germanic Tribes from its borders.3 Starting with the Treaty of Westphalia,
which ended the Thirty Years War in 1648, mercenaries were treated no differently than other
prisoners of war.4 In the early fourteenth century, the Byzantium Empire employed the services
of Spanish frontiersman.5 In the fifteenth century, princes and dukes often employed German,
Italian, or Swiss mercenaries to fight their wars.6 By the 1700’s, with the advent of large
conscript armies, mercenaries were highly respected strategic advisors and were generally treated
cordially when captured.7 During the American Revolution, Hessian mercenaries, who fought
for the British, were treated as prisoners of war as well.8 Hence, there is substantial historical

1

Edward Kwakwa, The Current Status of Mercenaries in the Law of Armed Conflict, 14 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP.
L. Rev. 67, 75 (1990). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11.]
2

Capt. John R. Cotton, Comment, The Rights of Mercenaries As Prisoners of War, 77 MIL. L. REV. 143, 149 (1977).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]
3

Id.

4

Cotton, supra note 2, at 151. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]

5

Kwakwa, supra note 1, at 75. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11.]

6

Id.

7

Cotton, supra note 2, at 150-1. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11.]

8

Id.
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evidence available to support the treatment of mercenaries as protected prisoners when captured
during armed conflict. Nevertheless, the current trend in international humanitarian law is to
criminalize mercenarism, thereby stripping the mercenary of his historical protected status.

III. STATUS OF MERCENARIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS
The primary rules of international law which determine the rights and status to be
accorded combatants who are captured by an opposing military force are stated in the Third
Geneva Convention of 1949.9 The main provision granting protection is Article 4(A) of the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.10 The text explains that
prisoners of war (POWs) are persons, who have fallen into the power of the enemy, belonging to
one of two categories. The first category defines those members of the armed forces of a Party
to the conflict, as well as members of militias or volunteer corps. The second category focuses
on members of other militias, volunteer corps, or organized resistance movements that belong to
a Party to the conflict and operate in or outside their own territory, even if the territory is
occupied. These second category militias must meet four criteria in order to qualify for POW
status. They must be (1) commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates, (2) have a
fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, (3) carry arms openly, and (4) conduct their
operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. The second category suggests that

9

Cotton, supra note 2, at 144. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]

10

Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 153.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 6.]
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mercenaries who participate on behalf of one of the belligerents in an international conflict, and
who satisfy the conditions, could be considered legitimate belligerents.11
1. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 Grant Prisoner of War Status to Captured
Mercenaries.
“The Geneva Conventions of 1949 do not provide expressis verbis for mercenaries,”12
and mercenaries are not specifically mentioned anywhere in Article 4(A).13 Furthermore, there
is no indication in the Convention Commentary that the subject of treatment of mercenaries was
ever specifically addressed,14 and there is no suggestion that the Article 4(A) criteria be
explicitly applicable only to regular combatants.15 It is possible that the Convention was
intended to be general in character and that in light of historical precedent at the time of the
drafting, mercenaries were assumed to fall within one of the protected categories.16 Thus, the
result was to retain the customary law application for regulars of recognized governments when
dealing with irregular combatants.17 This interpretation would appear to be supported by history
because the provisions of the Convention have traditionally been considered general in nature
and to be inclusive unless specifically exclusive in character.18

11

Kwakwa, supra note 1, at 86-7. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11.]

12

Kwakwa, supra note 1, at 86. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11.]

13

Cotton, supra note 2, at 155. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]

14

Id.

15

W. Thomas Mallison & Sally V. Mallison, The Juridical Status of Irregular Combatants under the International
Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, 9 CASE W. RES. J. INT. L. 39, 48 (1977). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 30.]
16

Cotton, supra note 2, at 155. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]

17

Mallison, supra note 15. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 30.]

18

Cotton, supra note 2, at 155. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]

14

Hence, due to the lack of mention throughout the text, it can be easily asserted that
mercenaries are accorded prisoner of war status upon capture under the 1949 Geneva
Convention.19 Article 4 provides that POW status is extended to those specified persons who
have fallen into the power of the enemy.20 Mercenaries are nearly always performing military
duties at the time of detention and should usually satisfy either of the two Article 4 categories.21
Once granted POW status, the mercenary taken captive is entitled to all protections the
Convention affords.22 As a POW, the mercenary cannot be charged with committing acts that
are legal under the laws of land warfare, and is entitled to certain procedural safeguards such as
the right to humane treatment, assistance of counsel, and the right against coercion.23 Therefore,
it can be extrapolated with certainty that the Geneva Conventions in no way criminalizes the fact
of being a mercenary.24
2. Article 47 of Protocol I Explicitly Denies Mercenaries Prisoner of War
Status.
In 1977, the mercenary’s luck ran out. During the debates of the Diplomatic Conference
on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed
Conflicts, a number of delegates affirmed that mercenaries should be denied combatant status.25

19

Marie-France Major, Mercenaries and International Law, 22 GA.J.INT’L & COMP.L. 103, 142-43 (1992).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21.]
20

Mallison, supra note 15. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 30.]

21

Cotton, supra note 2 , at 157. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]

22

Cotton, supra note 2, at 159. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]

23

Id.

24

Maj. Todd S. Milliard, Overcoming Post-Colonial Myopia: A Call to Recognize and Regulate Private Military
Companies, 176 MIL.L.REV. 1, 21-2 (2003). (Discusses the relationship between international humanitarian law and
private military companies.) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 20.]
25

Major, supra note 19, at 145. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21.]
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Based on a seemingly visceral reaction towards their use during two decades of conflict in postcolonial Africa, mercenaries were branded as criminals, regardless of who employed them or on
whose behalf they fought.26 The result was the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
(Protocol I).27 Protocol I, to which Rwanda is a party, is the first convention that expressly deals
with the legal status of mercenaries in the law of war.28 Articles 43 through 47 of Protocol I
form a section entitled “Combatant and Prisoner-of-War Status.”29 The basic concept of this
section was to create a single and nondiscriminatory set of rules applicable to all combatants,
regular and irregular alike.30 Another aim was to prescribe limited exceptions for spies,
mercenaries, and guerrillas.31
Article 47 explicitly states that a mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or a
prisoner of war and creates a mercenary definition with six elements. The Protocol I definition
describes a mercenary as any person who is specially recruited, locally or abroad, in order to
fight in an armed conflict and actually takes a direct part in the hostilities. The mercenary must
be motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is
promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation. Such compensation
must be shown to be substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar

26

Milliard, supra note 24, at 38. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 20.]

27

Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. (hereinafter “Protocol I”) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 1.]
28

Kwakwa, supra note 1, at 87. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11.]

29

George H. Aldrich, New Life for the Laws of War, 75 A.J.I.L. 764, 770 (1981). (Reviews the current status of
international humanitarian law in terms of a variety of different types of conflicts.) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 12.]
30

Id.

31

Id.
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ranks in the armed forces of that Party. The definition also requires that the mercenary is neither
a national of a Party to the conflict, nor a resident of territory controlled by a Party to the
conflict, and is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict. Finally, in order to
complete the Protocol I definition, it must be found that the mercenary was not sent on duty as a
member of the armed forces of a State not a Party to the conflict.
In very clear terms, there is no doubt that Article 47 of Protocol I condemns mercenary
activities and deprives mercenaries of the protections afforded lawful combatants and prisoners
of war.32 However, it is important to note that a captured mercenary is nevertheless accorded
some fundamental safeguards under the Protocol’s Article 75.33 Upon the drafting of Article 47,
it was clear that international law was moving towards a new direction regarding the legal status
of mercenaries captured during a conflict. Article 47 leaves the traditional practices of history
behind, and denies mercenaries virtually every international humanitarian legal protection.34
However, because a mercenary is deprived the status of combatant and POW, he becomes a
civilian, and therefore can fall under Article 535 of the Fourth Convention.36 One should note

32

Milliard, supra note 24, at 41. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 20.]

33

Kwakwa, supra note 1, at 90. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11.] (Article 75, Protocol I,
applies to persons who are in power of a Party to the conflict and who do not benefit from more favorable treatment
under the Conventions or Protocol I. Such persons “shall be treated humanely in all circumstances and shall enjoy,
as a minimum, the protection by this Article, without any adverse distinction based upon race, color, sex, language,
religion or belief, political or other opinion, national or social origin, or any other similar criteria. Article 75 also
has 3 paragraphs detailing the minimum definition of humane treatment, including procedures for the prosecution of
persons indicted for war crimes.) See Protocol I, art. 75. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1.]
34

Melysa H. Sperber, Note, John Walker Lindh and Yaser Esam Hamdi: Closing the Loophole in International
Humanitarian Law for American Nationals Captured Abroad While Fighting with Enemy Forces, 40 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 159, 195 (2003). (Discusses the tension between international humanitarian law and domestic criminal law as
applied to nationals captured abroad while fighting with adversary forces.) [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 22.]
35

Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians Persons in Time of War, art. 5, 12 August 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 287. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 5.]

36

Major, supra note 19, at 146. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21.]
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that before a mercenary can be deprived of POW status, there must be a decision based on the
Article 47 definition that he is in fact a mercenary.37 The general rule is that, pending a final
determination by a competent tribunal, the accused person is presumed to be a POW and must
therefore be protected by the Third Convention.38
3. Critics Consider Article 47 Inadequate and Incongruent with the
Principles of Human Rights.
Some argue that Article 47 violates the basic principle underlying Protocol I that
individuals who take an active part in hostilities should not be discriminated against on the basis
of their motives for joining in the combat.39 A more fundamental objection may be made based
on the need to expand protection under the laws of war to as many combatants and conflicts as
possible.40 Arguments have been asserted that it seems counter-intuitive and contradictory to
deprive mercenaries of combatant and POW status.41 “As odious as the activities of mercenaries
may be, it would accord with ordinary sense to grant them POW status if they complied with the
laws of war.”42 This would serve as an incentive for mercenaries to comply with the laws of
war.43 In addition, denial of POW status is at variance with the principle of humanity and the

37

Id.

38

Id.

39

Guy Roberts, The New Rules for Waging War: The Case Against the Ratification of Additional Protocol I, 26 VA.
J. INT’L L. 109, 138 (1985). (Argues that most participants in national liberation movements are almost always
motivated by political conviction) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 13.]
40

Kwakwa, supra note 1, at 88. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11.]

41

Kwakwa, supra note 1, at 88-9. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11.]

42

Kwakwa, supra note 1, at 89. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11.]

43

Id.
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cause of human rights in general.44 By encouraging mercenaries to comply with the laws of war,
legal scholars feel the security of the civilian populace will ultimately be enhanced.45
Another problematic aspect of Protocol I often commented on is that the mercenary
definition is “drawn so tight that hardly anyone, actually, will be so definable.”46 In other words,
a hired soldier can avoid being labeled a mercenary by simply enlisting in the armed forces of
the party on whose behalf he is fighting.47 “A state or entity engaging the services of mercenaries
will seek to avoid the characterization of the enlistees as mercenaries by declaring that they are
members of its armed forces.”48 In addition, the definition’s emphasis on motive, which
introduces a psychological element, may be difficult to establish.49 Critics claim that “although
the definition requires that the enlistee be motivated essentially by private gain, it is well-known
that monetary reward is not always the primary motivation which induces foreigners to enlist in
an armed conflict.”50 For example, participants in national liberation movements are almost
always motivated in part by political or religious convictions.51 Nonetheless, “despite the
numerous flaws discussed above, Article 47 is generally perceived as representing the most
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successful attempt, to date, in creating a legal definition of the term mercenary.”52 Ultimately, it
is apparent that Article 47 “denies mercenaries POW status as of right.”53
4. Protocol I as Customary International Law and Current Trends in the
Treatment of Captured Mercenaries.
An acknowledgement that Protocol I has ripened into customary international law would
eliminate the tension between Protocol I and The Geneva Conventions on the issue of treatment
of captured mercenaries. As of 2001, 155 States, including Rwanda, had ratified Protocol I,
making it one of the most widely ratified treaties.54 Its parties include seventeen of the nineteen
members of NATO and three of the Permanent Members of the Security Council.55 The Protocol
has been frequently invoked in various conflicts by governments, U.N. investigative bodies, and
the International Committee of the Red Cross.56 Furthermore, although the United States has not
yet ratified Protocol I, the United States has implemented the rules of the Protocol with the
Defense Department generally regarding it as a codification of the customary practice of nations
that is binding on all.57
Protocol I as customary international law governing international armed conflict would
be a stunning reversal of historical practice regarding captured mercenaries. However, Edward
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Kwakwa asserts that actual State practice on the Protocol is still in its formative stages.58 In
addition, while there is virtual agreement on the definition of a mercenary, there still seems to be
conflicting attitudes regarding their treatment.59 In fact, by 1991, there were no reported
incidents of treatment accorded to any captured mercenary subsequent to the drafting of Protocol
I.60 Hence, while a clear argument can be made that most provisions of Protocol I may be
customary international law, Kwakwa’s analysis suggests that Article 47 is far from attaining
that status. The tension between the Protocol and The Geneva Conventions, is far from
eliminated.

IV. STATUS OF MERCENARIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW GOVERNING INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICTS
1. Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions Grants a Minimal Level of Protection to
all Persons.
When the four Geneva Conventions were adopted in 1949, among the many hundreds of
articles codifying and developing the laws applicable to the conduct of international armed
conflict, only Article 3, common to all four conventions, set forth rules applicable to an “armed
conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory”61 of one of the Parties.62 As
soon as armed conflict is determined to exist, Article 3 automatically applies, imposing upon the
58
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Parties to an internal conflict the legal obligation to protect individuals who have not
participated, or are no longer participating in the hostilities.63 While of modest scope, Article 3
was a revolutionary development requiring humane treatment of all persons including prisoners,
the sick or wounded.64 Generally, the provisions of Article 3 emphasize basic humane treatment
and minimum procedural guarantees.65 The duty to implement Article 3 is unconditional for
both Parties and operates independently of the other party’s obligation.66 A breach by one party
cannot be invoked by the other party as grounds for its non-implementation of the mandatory
provisions of the article.67 In situations of non-international armed conflict, legal scholars claim
that captured mercenaries must be given those protections provided by Article 3 of the Geneva
Convention.68
2. Protocol II Expands Article 3’s Scope of Protections and does not Create a
Prisoner of War Regime.
During the 1970’s, negotiations in Geneva created an opportunity to expand the law
applicable in non-international armed conflicts by adopting a Protocol dealing with such
conflicts.69 The result was Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which applies together
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with Article 3.70 Protocol II applies to any non-international conflict “which takes place in the
territory of a High Contracting Party between members of its armed forces and dissident armed
forces or other organized armed groups.”71 The Protocol also substantially expands the
protections provided by Article 3, notably by prohibiting collective punishments, corporal
punishment, slavery, and orders to take no prisoners.72 Such acts, among others, are listed in
Article 4 of Protocol II, and are prohibited at all times and all places.73
In addition, Article 5 of Protocol II underscores the fact that there is no special prisoner
of war regime in the Protocol.74 This provision deals with “all persons deprived of, or restricted
in, their liberty for reasons related to the conflict.”75 No distinction is made among the possible
reasons for restricted liberty.76 Hence, it is immaterial whether a person is captured while
participating in hostilities, or on suspicion of espionage.77 Therefore, under Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions and Protocol II, mercenaries who are detained or interned for reasons

70

Akinrinade, supra note 63, at 419. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9.] See Additional
Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977. (hereinafter “Protocol II”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tab 2.]
71

Id.

72

Symposium, supra note 62, 60. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 28.]

73

Akinrinade, supra note 63, at 420. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9.]

74

Id.

75

See Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 relating to the Protection of Victims of
Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, art. 5. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 2.]

76

Akinrinade, supra note 63, at 420. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9.]

77

Akinrinade, supra note 63, at 420. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9.]

23

related to the armed conflict must be accorded the minimum guarantees with respect to medical
care, food, hygiene, safety, relief, religious practice, and working conditions.78

V. THE O.A.U. AND THE U.N.: INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONAL LAW
EXPLICITLY OUTLAWING THE PRACTICE OF MERCENARISM
1. The Organization for African Unity Creates the First Definition of a
Mercenary.
The Organization for African Unity (O.A.U.) was one of the first organizations to arrive
at a general definition of mercenaries.79 From 1964 to 1971, the O.A.U. adopted a series of
resolutions condemning the recruitment and use of mercenaries.80 In 1972, the O.A.U.
Committee of Experts presented its report, part of which was the draft Convention for the
Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa.81 The O.A.U.’s convention established mercenarism as a
crime, “especially when directed against African Liberation movements.”82 Even though these
resolutions and proposals had some moral effect upon the members of the O.A.U. in terms of
framing the issue of mercenarism, they were completely irrelevant to non-O.A.U. states who
promoted the recruitment of mercenaries for service in Africa.83
Through the years, U.N. resolutions echoed the same concerns of the O.A.U. In 1967, the
Security Council adopted a resolution condemning any state which permitted or tolerated the
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recruitment of mercenaries.84 A year later, the General Assembly passed Resolution 2395 which
condemned Portugal for its failure to grant independence to the territories under its dominion,
and appealed to all States to prevent the practice of mercenarism.85 “A major step, however, was
taken in 1968 when the General Assembly adopted Resolution 2465,”86 declaring that the
“practice of using mercenaries against movements for national liberation and independence is
punishable as a criminal act and that mercenaries themselves are outlaws…”.87
2. An Admirable Effort: The 1989 U.N. International Convention Against
Mercenarism.
In 1980, the momentum towards the criminalization of mercenarism, embodied in Article
47 of Protocol I, reached its summit when the United Nations confronted the issue in response to
member states’ dissatisfaction with the Protocol’s limited curtailment of mercenary activities.88
After nine years of diplomatic, legal and political wrangling, the U.N. produced the International
Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries (Mercenary
Convention).89 The Mercenary Convention was the product of an earnest attempt to create a
comprehensive legal document that would define mercenaries, enumerate specific mercenary
crimes, establish a regime of state responsibility, and create extradition procedures.90

84

Major, supra note 19, at 121. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21.]

85

Id., at 122. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21.]

86

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21.]

87

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21.]

88

Milliard, supra note 24, at 57. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 20.]

89

U.N. International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, G.A.Res.
44/34, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 44th Sess., 72d plen. Mtg.; Annex, Agenda Item 144, U.N. Doc. A/44/766 (1989),
reprinted in U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 306, U.N.Doc. A/44/49 (1990). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 7.]
90

Milliard, supra note 24, at 57-8. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 20.]

25

The Mercenary Convention provides an elaborate hybrid of a mercenary definition, and
relies on the six cumulative requirements of Protocol I, Article 47, for its primary mercenary
definition, but extends its coverage to all conflicts no matter how characterized.91 The Mercenary
Convention also implemented a secondary, complementary definition. The secondary mercenary
definition, found in Article 1(2) of the U.N. Mercenary Convention, states that a mercenary is
also any person who, in any other situation is specially recruited locally or abroad for the
purpose of participating in a concerted act of violence for two purposes. Those two purposes are
either overthrowing a Government or undermining the territorial integrity of a State. There are
four remaining elements to the Mercenary Convention’s secondary definition. The mercenary
must (1) be motivated to take part essentially by the desire for significant private gain, (2) is
neither a national nor a resident of the State against which such an act is directed, (3) has not
been sent by a State on official duty, and (4) is not a member of the armed forces of the State on
whose territory the act is undertaken. In addition to defining mercenaries, the Mercenary
Convention imposes criminal liability on individuals who recruit, use, finance or train
mercenaries, or who participate directly in hostilities or in a concerted act of violence, or attempt
to do so, or who act as an accomplice to such actions.
Even though the Mercenary Convention is an exhaustive instrument that embodies the
international community’s disdain for mercenarism during the late-twentieth century, it is
extremely important to note its overwhelming unpopularity. “The criticisms advanced in
connection with Article 47 continue to be applicable under the Convention. Of particular
disappointment is the fact that the question of motives was not further elaborated and that the
Convention did not recognize that a mercenary need not be a foreigner. However, as is evident
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from the Reports of the Ad Hoc committee, no Convention would have been adopted if the
definition of mercenary had been all-encompassing. Despite these problems the Convention
broadens and refines the definition of mercenary, and is therefore a welcome addition.”92
The Mercenary Convention required twenty-two states parties before it would enter into
force, but by 1998 only twelve nations had ratified it.93 It is important to note that the
Convention will be binding only on the states which agree to be a party to it.94 On September
20, 2001, Costa Rica became the twenty-second state party, and the Convention entered into
force the following month.95 As of June of 2003, one-hundred and sixty-seven of the U.N.
member states had opted to not become party to the Mercenary Convention;96 this is not a
ringing endorsement for the document or its legal validity. In addition, “the Committee’s terms
of reference also suggest that the Convention is more concerned with the jus ad bellum than the
jus in bello.”97

VI. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE TO THE “MIXED
CONFLICT” IN RWANDA
It is necessary to attempt to classify the Rwanda conflict in order to determine the liability
of the various actors. Generally, armed conflicts can be international or non-international armed
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conflicts, but they also can be a mix of the two.98 Furthermore, there are lesser situations of
internal disturbances which may not rise to the level of an armed conflict so as to trigger the
provisions of international humanitarian law.99 Therefore, a proper characterization determines
which rules of international humanitarian law, if any, are applicable to the conflict at hand.100
1. How to Determine the Existence of an Armed Conflict.
A “classification as international armed conflict means that the whole weight of the laws of
war will apply to the conflict. If the conflict is a non-international armed conflict, the rules of
international humanitarian law contained in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and
in Protocol II may be applicable, depending on the intensity of the conflict and whether or not
the State is a party to Protocol II. However, it becomes a matter of debate whether all the
provisions of the laws of war or international humanitarian law will be applicable.”101
The conflict in Rwanda is certainly an armed conflict because the term covers armed
confrontations between two ethnic factions within a State, the Hutus and Tutsis.102
In The Prosecutor v. Tadic, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (I.C.T.Y.) explained that an armed conflict exists “whenever there is
...protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or
between such groups within a State. International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of
such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until ... in the case of
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internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved.”103 According to the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (I.C.T.R.), the term armed conflict in itself suggests the existence of
hostilities between armed forces organized to a greater or lesser extent.104 Hence, the conformity
among both tribunals in the application of the “armed conflict” definition certainly gives weight
to a conclusion that the hostilities that have taken place Rwanda rise above minor internal
disturbances.
2. Rwanda’s Internal Conflict and the Concept of “Mixed Conflict.”
The I.C.T.R. Statute characterizes the situation in Rwanda as an internal armed
conflict.105 “Because the Security Council is not a legislative body, it had no competency to
enact substantive law for the I.C.T.R. Instead, it authorized the I.C.T.R. to apply existing
international humanitarian law applicable to non-international armed conflict.”106 Specifically,
Article 4 of the I.C.T.R. Statute empowers the tribunal to prosecute persons committing or
ordering to be committed serious violations of Article 3 and Protocol II. 107 Furthermore, “the
humanitarian law included in the I.C.T.R.'s Statute consists of the Genocide Convention, which
was ratified by Rwanda, crimes against humanity as defined by the Nuremberg Charter, Article 3
Common to the Geneva Conventions, and Additional Protocol II, also ratified by Rwanda.”108
Even so, Rwanda’s 1994 war can also be categorized as a mixed conflict because of the
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combination of internal tribal rivalry and foreign influence.109
Many conflict situations in the world today contain international and non-international
aspects.110 An internationalized internal armed conflict is a civil war in which the armed forces
of a foreign power intervene.111 However, this definition is not exhaustive.112 “Such a conflict
has been defined as a conflict which is internal in certain respects and international in others.”113
A non-international armed conflict may become internationalized if: (1) a State victim of an
insurrection identifies the insurgents as belligerents; (2) one or more foreign States assist one of
the parties with their own armed forces; [or], (3) the armed forces of two foreign States
intervene, each in aid of a different party.114 Also, while civil wars are solely internal, a mixed
conflict can also occur when a foreign power intervenes in an existing civil war.115 Unlike the
two distinct categories of international and non-international armed conflicts, it should be noted
that an internationalized internal armed conflict lacks specific international provisions.116 While
international humanitarian law has yet to fully address these types of armed conflicts, they occur
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with increasing frequency in the world today.117 Though some scholars may prefer to analyze the
Rwandan conflict via the “mixed conflict” concept, for purposes of applying international
humanitarian law, it is best to use the I.C.T.R. Statute’s finding of an internal conflict.

VII. THE TADIC CASE: THE CREATION OF NEW CUSTOMARY LAW
APPLICABLE TO NON-INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS
In 1979, Professor L. C. Green asserted that mercenaries were still legally
combatants, who were entitled to treatment as POWs and only liable to trial for such crimes
against the law of war or the criminal law that they commit.118 In making his conclusion, Green
cited the fact that Protocol I was only in force for those ratifying, and that the essence of
humanitarian law and the law of war was even-handed, so that even those engaged in an
unlawful war remain protected.119 Since then, the sheer amount of international jurisprudence
has drastically increased. Actual case law now exists to supplement academic theory. In The
Prosecutor v. Tadic, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia directly dealt
with the issue of applying international humanitarian law to a mixed conflict.
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1. The I.C.T.Y. Creates New Customary International Law Applicable to
Conflicts Not of An International Character.
“The judgment in the first international war crimes tribunal since World War II was
handed down on May 7, 1997” by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
in The Prosecutor v. Tadic.120 “With the spotlight of the international media focused on the
proceedings, the Yugoslavia Tribunal itself was on trial, just as the Nuremberg and Tokyo War
Crimes Tribunals were the subject of intense international scrutiny in the years after the trials of
the major Nazi and Japanese war criminals.” 121 Dusko Tadic, the defendant, a Bosnian-Serb,
stood on trial on thirty-one counts of Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations of
the laws and customs of war, and crimes against humanity.122 “The three-judge Trial Chamber
unanimously found Tadic guilty of eleven of the thirty-one counts and sentenced him to twenty
years of imprisonment.”123 Both the Defendant and the Prosecutor appealed the Judgment.124
“The Tribunal concluded that some customary rules had developed to the point where
they govern internal conflicts.”125 Those customary rules covered such areas as the “protection
of all those who do not (or no longer) take active part in the hostilities.”126 “The Tribunal limited
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its reach of its holding to serious violations, stating that only a number of rules governing
international armed conflicts have gradually been extended to apply to internal conflicts, and that
the extension does not consist of a full and mechanical transplant, but of the general essence of
those rules. These caveats are important but do not make it much easier to identify those rules
and principles which have already crystallized as customary law.”127
2. The I.C.T.Y Appeals Chamber Extends Article 3 and Protocol II Protections
to all Persons No Longer Taking Part in Hostilities.
The Appeals Chamber’s later decision in the Tadic case confirmed the presence of four
streams of new customary international law for internal armed conflicts. First, rules initially
stated in treaty provisions governing non-international armed conflicts, such as Article 3 and
Additional Protocol II, were transformed into customary law.128 Second, the decision constituted
the first judicial affirmation that violation of Article 3 entails individual criminal responsibility
under customary law.129 Third, “general principles first developed for international wars, such as
proportionality and necessity, may be extended through customary law to civil wars. Fourth,
prohibitions on certain weapons and means of warfare such as poison gas and land mines can
gradually be applied to internal armed conflicts through customary law.”130
Of great importance to the issue of a captured mercenary, the Appeals Chamber
explained that customary international humanitarian law extends protection to “persons taking no
active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down there arms
and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any cause…without any
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adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith.”131 Furthermore, “it is unnecessary
to define exactly the line dividing those taking an active part in hostilities and those who are not
so involved. It is sufficient to examine the relevant facts of each victim and to ascertain whether,
in each individual’s circumstances, that person was actively involved in hostilities at the relevant
time.”132
Hence, the Appeals chamber essentially stated that where Article 3 and Protocol II once
existed as conventional international law, they both now exist as customary law to be applied to
all internal conflicts. Therefore, the only way a mercenary can be dealt with according to
Protocol I, Article 47, is to have the conflict in question clearly defined as an international armed
conflict. As long as a conflict avoids being classified as an international armed conflict, the
I.C.T.Y.’s customary law governing internal armed conflict is controlling. This application of
new customary law, coupled with the I.C.T.R. Statute’s internal conflict characterization, covers
captured mercenaries with a blanket of protection via Article 3 and Protocol II. To assert
otherwise would be problematic since Article 4 of the I.C.T.R. Statute authorizes the prosecution
of those who violate Article 3 and Protocol II. As discussed previously, these provisions do not
implement a prisoner-of-war regime that distinguishes mercenaries from regular combatants.
Thus, denying Article 3 and Protocol II protections to captured mercenaries would be in
violation of the I.C.T.R. Statute itself, in addition to new customary law. It appears, then, that
captured mercenaries dodge the explicit denial of protection found in Protocol I, and are entitled
to the basic protections afforded under the I.C.T.Y.’s new customary laws, recognized by the
U.N. Security Council as part of the I.C.T.R.’s subject-matter jurisdiction.
131
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VIII. THE RECOGNTION OF A STATE OF BELLIGERENCY: AN ALTERNATIVE
APPROACH FOR THE FUTURE OR A DEAD LEGAL CONCEPT?
According to the I.C.T.Y., it is an established principle of international law that all Parties
are bound by the whole of international humanitarian law applicable to armed conflicts when
there is a recognition of a state of belligerency.133 The concept of belligerency in international
law deals with occurrences of civil war.134 “Traditional international law of war puts internal
wars into three categories: rebellion, insurgency, and belligerency. Rebellions are small-scale,
localized conflicts which are usually solved with police measures.”135 A state of belligerency
may be declared when four elements are met: (1) the conflict is more widespread than a local
dispute; (2) the opposition controls a significant portion of territory; (3) the opposition
administers the occupied land; and (4) the opposition is obeying the international laws of war.136
“An insurgency is a conflict that lies somewhere between a rebellion and a state of
belligerency.”137
Upon recognition of a state of belligerency, insurgents are afforded important benefits but
also responsibilities.138 Captured members of the rebel armed forces, as well as soldiers of the
incumbent government, are entitled to prisoner of war status.139 In fact, the conflict is viewed in
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terms of an international armed conflict rather than one that is internal and the humanitarian laws
of warfare become applicable to the hostilities.140 Intuitively, this would lead an international
lawyer to conclude that the explicit prohibition of conferring POW status to mercenaries in
Protocol I, Article 47 would be enforced in the doctrine of belligerency. However, such a
conclusion would be improper and problematic.
A captured mercenary would most likely still have the I.C.T.Y.’s Article 3 protections
under new customary international law. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that some
scholars believe that Article 3 is the only applicable law relating to internal armed conflicts.141
Since Article 3 is not dependent on recognition of belligerency, some feel that it did away with
the need to discuss the existence of the four belligerency criteria.142 In addition, nations have
ignored the formality of declaring a state of belligerency in recent wars, including those in the
Congo, Yemen, and Algeria.143 In fact, the last time the concept of belligerency was seriously
applied was during the American Civil War.144 The last time it was even debated as applicable
to an internal armed conflict was more than sixty years ago, during the Spanish Civil War.145
This has led some scholars to assert that the concept no longer comports with the realities of
modern civil war.146 However, as future conflicts continue to manifest in ways the drafters of
current international humanitarian law would not have anticipated, the concept of belligerency
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may serve as a future alternative legal mechanism for determining when regular and irregular
combatants are afforded certain protections under the international laws of warfare.

IX. CONCLUSION: MERCENARIES ARE ENTITLED TO THE MINIMAL
PROTECTIONS CONTAINED IN ARTICLE 3 AND PROTOCOL II.
At one time, internal conflicts were once considered outside the purview of international
law since they were regarded as totally within the domestic jurisdiction of the state in which they
were being waged.147 The Geneva Conventions, specifically Article 3 and Protocol II, modified
international law in order to afford some protections to victims of internal strife. Since the end
of World War II, civil wars have outnumbered international conflicts two-to-one.148 “In general,
the international community has reacted slowly, unwilling or unable to take action to end
violence that has essentially consumed nations.”149 As the conflict in Rwanda shows, future,
modern conflicts will most likely continue to test the effectiveness and vitality of international
humanitarian law as it stands today. The issue this note addresses, the legal status of captured
mercenaries in intra-national conflicts, certainly brings to light the need to update the
international law of war to modern realities.
While Protocol I explicitly denies captured mercenaries the protections garnered by being
granted prisoner of war status, it does so only in international conflicts. Article 3 and Protocol II
created minimum protections afforded all those who no longer played an active role in the
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hostilities of a conflict. According to the I.C.T.R. Statute, the Rwandan conflict is an internal
armed conflict, while some legal writers feel it is best described by the emerging concept of a
mixed conflict.
In The Prosecutor v. Tadic, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
declared that the protections created in Article 3 and Protocol II had crystallized into customary
law. These protections emphasize humane treatment, human dignity, and certain procedural
safeguards. The I.C.T.Y. added that this new form of customary law even applies to all
combatants no longer playing an active role in the hostilities. Acknowledging that the
international community opted to classify the Rwandan conflict as an internal conflict, it is clear
that the I.C.T.Y.’s customary law entitles captured mercenaries the protections created in Article
3 and Protocol II. To assert otherwise would be counter-intuitive because Article 4 of the
I.C.T.R. Statute itself seeks to prosecute those who violate Article 3 and Protocol II. Therefore,
denying these protections to captured mercenaries would be in violation of the I.C.T.R. Statute
and new customary international law. Therefore, the only way a mercenary could lawfully be
treated under the strict Protocol I, Article 47 standards, would be if he was captured while
participating in a conflict that could be clearly classified as an international armed conflict. Such
a classification is inapplicable to the Rwandan conflict.
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